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Christians are becoming increasingly vocal in their criticism of scientific psychology. In 
their criticisms Christian anti-psychologists have devalued knowledge gained through 
research and suggested both that the scientific method is inappropriate for studying human 
behavior and that the deception inherent in psychological research is immoral This article 
examines these concerns and argues that the more subjective alternatives suggested by the 
critics of psychology suffer fiten many of the same limitations as scientific psychology and 
that taking such an approach would amount to substituting uncontrolled error for controlled 
error and uncontrolled deception for controlled deception
unique perspective on human behavior that 
cannot be duplicated by other disciplines 
using different methodologies.
Some Christians, however, are uncom- 
fortable with psychology in its empirical form. 
For example, a recent issue of the Bible- 
Science Newsletter, normally dedicated to 
promoting creationism, devoted an entire 
issue to critiquing psychology. Articles from 
this issue included “The Failure of Modern 
Psychology” (Thom, 1986), “Why Bother 
With Psychology?” (Bartz, 1986), and 
“Sensible Psychology: How Creation Makes 
the Difference” (Pearcy, 1986). These articles 
warn that modem psychology is spiritually 
dangerous, that psychology is not a science, 
and that psychology is invalid since it relies on 
ways of knowing other than through authority 
(i.e., the Bible). But when Christians, or 
others, criticize psychology’s reliance on 
empirical methods, they are attacking its 
distinctiveness and what has made it a 
valuable contributor to human understanding. 
Further, in arguing for the use of non- 
empirical methods, the critics of psychology
Throughout the short history of modern 
psychology, the Christian community has 
viewed both the methods and results of 
psychology with suspicion. While this sus־ 
picion has a broad base, many concerns can be 
traced to psychology’s approach to knowledge 
through the use of the scientific method. When 
psychology emerged from philosophy as a 
separate discipline, its distinctiveness was in 
its adoption of scientific methodology from the 
natural sciences. The issues of philosophical 
psychology were reframed to conform to, and 
were explained within the confines of, the 
modem scientific model. Empiricism, deter־ 
minism, relativism, and reductionism became 
the major tenets of psychology. This reframing 
meant that certain questions, not suitable for 
scientific investigation, could not be asked and 
others could not be answered satisfactorily. 
For the most part, however, use of the 
scientific method has provided us with a
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This conflict between Christianity’s ap- 
proach to knowledge and other approaches 
can, at times, take on tones of anti-intellec- 
tualism. For example, Leahey (1980) in his 
history of psychology notes that some 
Christians have always rejected the role of 
reason in seeking truth, and writes:
It should be pointed out that not all Christian thinkers in 
whatever time have accepted the rule of reason in seeking 
Godly truth. Augustine had to struggle against ideas of 
those like Tertullian (160-230) who rejected the classical 
philosophers. St Bernard ( 1091-115 3) decried excessive 
“curiosity״  about Christian beliefs. Savonarola (1452- 
1498) burnt heretical books.. . .  All these people empha- 
sized the mystical aspects . . .  the immediate inward 
confrontation of man with God.. . .  They rejected reason 
as at best unnecessary, at worst heretical, (p. 58)
This concern over the proper path to knowledge 
continues today and can be seen in the 
attitudes of some Christians. Tim LaHaye 
(1980) writes, “Only two lines of reasoning 
permeate all of literature: biblical revelation 
(the wisdom of God) and the wisdom of man” 
(p. 27). LaHaye believes that man’s use of his 
reasoning abilities has had an evil influence in 
the development of western civilization and is 
pervasive today. Similarly, William Kirk 
Kilpatrick ( 1983), in expressing his belief that 
psychology is a destructive force, writes, 
“You needn’t be a scholar to sense this. In 
fact, scholarship is often a hindrance to 
understanding what is really happening” (p. 
30). Like St. Bernard, LaHaye, Kilpatrick, 
and other Christian critics of psychology seem 
to decry excessive curiosity, at least when 
applied to human behavior.
If reason is not an acceptable source for 
reliable knowledge, then knowledge gained 
through approaches that use reason are not to 
be trusted. To deal with such a weakness in 
psychology, some Christian critics emphasize 
the spiritual over the psychological. For 
example, Billheimer (1977) writes:
Except where there is organic difficulty, the root of all 
conflicts in the home is not mental, but spiritual 
Psychology and psychiatry are usually totally irrele- 
van t. . .  Many spiritually discerning persons are quite 
convinced that psychiatry is Satan’s substitute for the 
Biblical remedy for disturbed relations, (p. 89)
Others would argue that psychology isn’t 
merely “irrelevant” but rather is the cause of
overlook the weaknesses in the alternative 
methods that they advocate. This article 
examines the current criticism of scientific 
psychology and the alternatives implied or 
suggested by the critics.
Conflicting Paths to Knowledge
Part of the conflict between Christian anti- 
psychologists and psychology is over the 
proper path to knowledge. There is, of course, 
more than one way to knowledge and each 
path to knowledge has its strengths and limits. 
Perhaps the oldest approach is a reliance on 
“authority.” In this view, answers to mysteries 
can be obtained by reference to recognized 
authorities. The Bible is such an authority to 
Christians because of its revelatory nature. A 
second path to knowledge is through ‘ ‘ intuition 
and subjective experience.” An example of 
this would be creative writers and artists who 
represent a view of reality based on their 
personal experiences and on their interpre- 
tation of that experience. The wide variety in 
the experiences of writers provides us with 
varied and interesting interpretations of the 
world. A third path to knowledge is through 
“logic and rational thought” Rationalism 
relies on reason to establish truth. A fourth 
path to knowledge is through “logical positiv- 
ism,” which rejects intuition as a reliable 
source of knowledge and relies instead on 
observation. While logic and reason are a 
valuable part of the process, confirmation 
must ultimately come through observation and 
experimentation.
Logical positivism serves as the philo- 
sophical foundation for a psychology which 
emphasizes observation, measurement, and 
experimentation(i.e., empiricism) as necessary 
components in the search for knowledge. 
Christianity, on the other hand, emphasizes 
reliance on revelation as an authority and 
values faith and subjective experiences. It is 
not surprising, then, that a religion that 
emphasizes faith and belief in forces which 
cannot be seen, measured, or quantified, has 
difficulty accepting a methodology that 
emphasizes that which can be seen, measured, 
and quantified.
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of unreferenced studies which indicate that 
nonintervention is as useful as psychothera- 
peutic intervention, and second by pointing 
out that the field of psychology has grown at 
the same time as the number of psychological 
problems in our society. Although Kilpatrick 
does not cite any numbers to support his 
argument, he nevertheless is implying a 
statistical case against psychology. He then 
goes further, though, and devalues his own 
empirical case, writing:
I don’t want to leave the impression that there is 
conclusive proof of psychology’s failure. Statistical 
evidence always has its problems. For instance, the fact 
that two things occur together is no proof that one causes 
the other.. . .  The fact that the growth of psychology 
corresponds to growing social prolems could conceivably 
be only a coincidence, (p. 33)
Since Kilpatrick ( 1983) is clearly devaluing 
research here, how then does he expect the 
reader to determine the fitness of psychology? 
Ideas are to be checked against “common 
sense.״  Kilpatrick writes:
Take, for example, two of the most tenaciously held 
claims of popular psychology: the idea that role-playing 
stunts our self-expression and the idea that venting anger 
is good for us. If you subject either of these notions to a 
moment’s reflection, you will see there are a great many 
instances where the reverse is true. (p. 34)
While claiming that two of psychology’s most 
tenaciously held claims are that “role playing 
stunts our self-expression” and “venting anger 
is good for us” is wildly misrepresentative, our 
main interest here is his belief that a “moment’s 
reflection” will invalidate psychological re- 
search. Christian anti-psychologists often 
seem to value intuitive processes like “reflec- 
tion” and “common sense” above psychology’s 
empirical tradition of systematic research. But 
they fail to see that what is “common sense” to 
one person may not be to another. It is 
common sense that, in dating, “birds of a 
feather flock together.” In other words, the 
more similar people are, the more they will be 
attracted to each other. It is also common 
sense that “opposites attract” Conflicts such 
as these arise because a person’s common 
sense is actually a collection of their personal 
experiences and beliefs and may have little or 
nothing in common with another person’s 
experiences and beliefs.
many, of society’s problems. For example, 
Paul Vitz (1977) argues that psychology is 
“deeply anti-Christian” and has been for 
years “destroying individuals, families, and 
communities” because of its “destructive 
logic” (p. 10). Even attempts at Christian 
psychologies are accused of diluting the “milk 
of the word” (Smith, 1975). Others, focusing 
on different paths to knowledge put forth by 
psychology and theology, have argued that 
when empirical psychology and the Bible 
contradict, the authority of the Bible must take 
precedence (Crabb, 1981). While it is beyond 
the scope of this article to specifically deal 
with the question of biblical authority (see 
Breshears & Larzelere, 1981), it does appear 
that among Christians and Christian psycholo- 
gists there exists a widespread, broadly based 
anti-psychology movement
Christian Anti-Psychology and 
Non-Empirical Ways of Knowing
Two Christian critics of psychology, 
William Kirk Kilpatrick (1983, 1985) and 
Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen (1982, 1985) 
have emerged in recent years as particularly 
visible and have the distinction of making their 
living in psychology while at the same time 
critiquing it. While Kilpatrick and Van 
Leeuwen criticize psychology from different 
perspectives, underlying both sets of concerns 
is a discomfort with psychology’s empirical 
path to knowledge and a belief that psycholo- 
gists overlook important intuitive sources of 
knowledge in their quest for objectivity.
An example of this emphasis on intuition 
and devaluing of empiricism can be seen in 
Kilpatrick’s (1983) book, Psychological 
Seduction Here Kilpatrick accuses psychology 
of not only leading Christians away from their 
faith but that even non-Christians have “been 
led away from . . .  [their] better instincts and 
common sense” (p. 26). Kilpatrick highly 
values “common sense” in his book, but does 
not value scientific research. For example, 
Kilpatrick attempts to make the point that 
there is reason to “doubt the competence of 
psychological helpers” (p. 28). Kilpatrick first 
makes his point by uncritically listing a string
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to creative writers and their literary characters. 
While it is an interesting collection of material, 
it represents only one person’s private world 
view. Empirical research, on the other hand, 
requires public verifiability to avoid this kind 
of subjectivism and overgeneralization.
Like Kilpatrick (1983), Christian psychol- 
ogy critic Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen ( 1982, 
1985) values subjective experience over the 
empiricism of psychology and would replace 
or at least modify the methods of psychology 
to make more room for intuition and subjective 
experience. Van Leeuwen’s criticisms, how- 
ever, are better supported and more specific 
than Kilpatrick’s, and more clearly focus on 
psychology’s methodology.
Van Leeuwen (1982) likens modern 
psychology to a “sorcerer’s apprentice,” a 
reference to psychology’s patterning of itself 
after the natural sciences. In her attacks on the 
methodology of psychology, she focuses on 
experimental psychology and its reliance on 
controlled conditions. Van Leeuwen argues 
that (a) psychology’s experimental method- 
ology has shown itself to be unsuccessful in 
achieving what a science of psychology aims 
to achieve, and (b) the moral cost of psycho- 
logical experimentation is unacceptably high. 
We will return later to her concern over the 
morality of psychological research and focus 
at this point on her concern over psychology’s 
use of the experimental method.
Among other criticisms, Van Leeuwen 
(1982) argues that the experimental method is 
inappropriate for psychological research since 
humans exhibit reflexivity in experiments 
when they know the purpose of the experiments, 
that experimental results are not exportable 
since they are situation-specific, and that the 
adoption of the methods of the natural 
sciences has led psychology to ignore “many 
specifically human concerns” (p. 305). While 
it is beyond the scope of this article to respond 
to all of her charges (see Foster, 1984; Yeats, 
1984), it is interesting to note that, like 
Kilpatrick ( 1983), Van Leeuwen uses anecdotes 
and personal experience in a way that goes 
beyond simple illustration and shows her 
preference for this particular way of knowing.
Van Leeuwen (1982) periodically punc­
Since Kilpatrick (1983) makes it clear 
that he does not value “scholarship” and 
empirical ways of knowing, and that he 
believes psychology is replacing religion, you 
might expect that he would make his case 
against psychology on the basis of Scripture 
and reference to authority, as many Christian 
critics do. Kilpatrick, however, prefers intuition 
and subjective experience to authority, and 
supports his case through personal experience, 
anecdotes, and even the literary characters of 
creative writers. Kilpatrick opens his book 
with an anecdote based on his personal 
experience, and these kinds of examples 
populate his entire book. At one point he 
suggests that psychology has created a “climate 
of unrelenting seriousness” (p. 64). Then, 
after pointing out that “I cannot prove 
statistically what I am about to say” (which is 
a peculiar comment since he does not value 
statistics), he suggests that this “unrelenting 
seriousness” has produced a social climate 
which “does not allow much room for spirited 
eccentricity, for the larger-than-life character 
represented in literature by Sir John Falstaff 
or Samuel Pickwick” (p. 65). Kilpatrick’s 
reference to the “climate of unrelenting 
seriousness” in the world illustrates another 
part of the problem with intuitive ways of 
knowing. We regret that Kilpatrick perceives 
the world as being unrelentingly serious, but 
since our subjective worlds are not, we believe 
he is overgeneralizing. In fact, it is possible 
that Kilpatrick is the only person in existence 
with this feeling of unrelenting seriousness. 
His subjective experience tells him that his 
world perception is real but it cannot tell him 
what others are experiencing. Further, his 
reasoning that since characters like John 
Falstaff don’t exist in society, psychology 
must be preventing it, may make intuitive 
sense but sounds irrational and is a good 
argument for the use of logic and empirical 
methods.
Kilpatrick’s( 1983) case against empirical 
psychology, then, is primarily based on 
intuition and is made up of selective “statis- 
tics”—that are largely unreported, unreferenced, 
and not respected by the author himself— 
anecdotes, personal experience, and reference
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& Nisbett, 1980). This so-called “vividness 
effect” tends to invalidate statistical evidence 
with a single example. Normally a single 
example would have little statistical or logical 
importance, but if the case is particularly vivid 
in your mind then it assumes an importance 
and influence in your thinking that is out of 
proportion. It is understandable then, that 
Kilpatrick (1983) and Van Leeuwen (1982) 
would be so powerfully influenced by their 
personal experiences. Kilpatrick seems par- 
ticularly dominated by his subjective, vivid 
experiences and these permeate his writings 
about psychology. It is disturbing to realize 
that he is passing these vivid examples on to 
his readers through books and articles which 
may be having a disproportionate influence on 
Christians considering psychological services 
or careers in psychology.
We do not doubt the authenticity of the 
experiences of Kilpatrick (1983) and Van 
Leeuwen (1982), but in addition to our 
concern about overgeneralization, we cannot 
help but wonder if any others present perceived 
the event in the same way? Did others in the 
congregation note the same increase in interest 
that Kilpatrick noted upon the mention of 
Erich Fromm? Or was it just that Kilpatrick’s 
awareness level was increased by the mention 
of a fellow psychologist? Did others present at 
the suicide described by Van Leeuwen feel it 
was “just another psychology experiment,” 
and did they hesitate to call for help? Certainly 
other anti-psychologists would tend to accept 
this as further proof of psychology’s negative 
effect, but is it really reliable? The power of the 
personal experience tends to induce intellec- 
tual egocentrism, making it difficult to recognize 
that others may not have reacted the same 
way, or have perceived the same thing, as 
yourself.
Scientific psychology is certainly not 
immune to problems of subjective bias. The 
picture of psychology as a completely objective, 
carefully reasoned experimental science has 
been successfully questioned by a variety of 
psychologists, historians, and philosophers, 
including Kuhn (1970) and Lakatos (1970). 
In addition, the “halo effect,” a tendency to 
generalize based on one positive quality, and
tuates her arguments with stories from her 
personal experience and the experiences of 
others. While it is common to illustrate with 
stories, Van Leeuwen and Kilpatrick (1983) 
go beyond this and seem to build their cases on 
such experiences and “common sense.” For 
example, in arguing that psychology’s use of 
deception has created a climate of suspicion in 
the country, Van Leeuwen uses the story of a 
student who bursts into her office after having 
just found a person lying in a pool of blood. In 
explaining why he hesitated in coming to call 
for help, he stated, “I thought it was just 
another psychology experiment” (p. 303). 
The ironic thing about this example is that it 
follows a lengthy chastisement of psychology 
for overgeneralizing research results, and Van 
Leeuwen fails to point out that her concerns 
about overgeneralization apply whether the 
incident in question is part of a psychology 
experiment or part of her personal experience. 
Instead, Van Leeuwen labels this the “boy 
who cried wolf effect” (p. 303) and asserts 
that psychology’s practices have had a dele־ 
terious effect on helping behavior.
The tendency of people to be drawn to 
personal experience and vivid stories is 
understandable. Professors frequently run 
into this in their classroom experiences. 
Whenever presenting normative data it is 
inevitable that some student will raise their 
hand and point out that they “know someone” 
who is not like that. What they fail to see is 
that this personal experience adds only one to 
the sample. When Van Leeuwen (1982) 
experienced a student bursting into her office 
and commenting about psychology it served as 
an emotionally powerful support for her 
beliefs. When Kilpatrick (1983) heard Erich 
Fromm’s name mentioned in church and 
noted a renewed interest in the sermon it 
supported his claim that psychology was 
replacing religion. But we need to recognize 
that both of these incidents may be isolated 
and atypical. The power of the personal 
experience cannot be denied, yet the limits 
must also be noted.
Researchers have documented this ten- 
dency for people to overgeneralize as a result 
of a single vivid incident (e.g., Hamill, Wilson,
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and believes that the goal of research should 
be to “use the subjectivity of the co-investigator 
rather than try to control it” (p. 38).
Attempts to get the psychological inside 
view can be traced back to psychology’s 
beginning and the use of the “introspective 
method,” and is certainly not a new innova- 
tion. In fact, the inside view is valued in 
psychology and is solicited through various 
empirically derived self-report scales. There 
are limits on the usefulness of the inside view, 
however, even if it is approached systematically. 
Hebb ( 1974), in reflecting on the push within 
psychology to become a more “human” 
science, points out that many of the early 
founders of psychology, like Kulpe, Wundt, 
and Titchener, took a subjective approach to 
psychology and used introspection to get the 
inside view. In comparing the contributions of 
the early introspectionists to other psycholo- 
gists who took an objective approach, such as 
Kohler, Le win, and Harlow, Hebb asks “what 
is there to cite as a contribution from the 
subjective method that can be put beside their 
work?” (p. 74). Even contemporary psycholo- 
gists who advocate a role for introspective 
methods recognize the problems. Lieberman
(1979), in recommending a limited return to 
the use of introspection, noted that “ intro- 
spection is limited not only in its scope. . .  but 
in its accuracy. In some cases, this may be 
because of the subjects’ limited ability to 
discriminate among internal states; in others, 
because of forgetting or even dishonesty” (p. 
332). Empirical methodologies can only be as 
reliable as the information source, and 
subjective experience is notably unreliable. 
While it is recognized that scientific methods 
cannot completely eliminate the problem of 
subjectivism, procedures have been developed 
for minimizing its influence. Abandoning or 
significantly modifying these procedures would 
be counterproductive unless the new methods 
can deal with the inaccuracy of subjective 
observations and the problems of forgetting 
and dishonesty.
Van Leeuwen (1985) does not advocate a 
complete abandonment of the scientific method, 
but rather believes that we must be willing to 
modify our procedures to allow the person
the “experimenter bias effect,” the tendency 
to distort research results to match your 
hypotheses, are among the recognized subjec- 
tive influences in psychology. But there are 
two critical differences between empirical 
psychology and the non-empirical approach 
suggested by Van Leeuwen (1982,1985) and 
Kilpatrick (1983, 1985). First, scientific 
psychology has developed methodologies to 
control for these recognized problems of 
subjective bias. But in the anti-empirical world 
of psychology’s critics no such methodologies 
exist and subjective bias abounds. With the 
scientific method, the use of control groups, 
blind and double blind procedures, replication, 
ancy o forth, all can help limit subjective bias. 
No similar controls are possible in non- 
empirical approaches. The second difference 
between empirical and subjective approaches 
to psychology is that an empirical psychology 
must ultimately face the test of public verifi- 
cation. Kilpatrick’s subjective view operates 
within his personal reality, a reality that many 
or few may share depending on their personal 
experiences. Findings from empirical psychol- 
ogy, however, must be publically demonstrable 
and verifiable. In the development of psy- 
chology, the scientific method was adopted as 
a unique approach to the questions of 
philosophy and as a way out of the trap of 
subjectivism.
Should We Humanize
Psychology’s Methods?
According to the critics, psychology’s 
methodological problems can be solved by 
humanizing psychology. In writing about this 
movement, Van Leeuwen (1985) says:
Human actions, they say, cannot be understood merely by 
observation and description from an outsider’s point of
view Consequently methods are needed that will
enable the scientist to understand, in active cooperation 
with the subjects, how the subjects see their particular 
situation, (pp. 73-74)
Another vocal advocate of a human psychology, 
Kirk Farnsworth (1985), also favors getting 
the “inside view” through a more subjective 
approach to research. He would relabel the 
subject in an experiment a “co-investigator”
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through his “ imaginative understanding” was 
truly representative of their values.
We can accept this type of research within 
a broad definition of empiricism, but generali- 
zations from these results would have to be 
severely limited due to the subjectivism 
introduced by the procedures. While Van 
Leeuwen (1982) correctly points out that 
rigorously controlled experimentation limits 
generalizability, it is also true that generaliza- 
tion from research using the methods she 
advocates should be even more restricted 
Kitwood’s (1980) method is empirical in its 
basic approach, but the procedures used raise 
questions about the authenticity of the 
responses, the accuracy of Kitwood’s imajjjpa- 
tive interpretation of those responses, and the 
validation procedures used Studies like these 
may provide information which traditional 
methods do not, but they certainly do not 
improve generalizability.
On the Morality of Scientific Methods
Van Leeuwen (1982) has questioned the 
morality of the scientific method because of 
the necessity of using deception in certain 
kinds of research, and implies this is a 
particularly Christian concern. Similarly, 
Farnsworth (1985) expresses concern about 
the “possible harm from deception” and 
writes that psychologists need to stop “lying” 
(p. 25). We, too, are concerned with the moral 
dilemma created by the necessary use of 
deception and with researchers who step 
beyond the ethical boundaries when using 
deception. We contend, however, that unin־ 
tentional deception is often a hidden part of the 
alternative methods the critics advocate. The 
lack of control inherent in the methods of 
“humanized research” greatly increases the 
probability that the results could have been a 
product of any number of uncontrolled 
variables. The non־empirical researcher is 
simply more vulnerable to self-deception. 
Experimentalists are at least conscious of 
their deception and use “debriefings” to 
disclose the true nature of the research and to 
deal with any discomforture that might have 
been created. Why then is it immoral to
being studied to be more human. To illustrate 
the kind of research she believes psychology 
should be engaged in, she cites a study of 
adolescent values conducted by Tom Kitwood
(1980). In this preferred approach, 150 
adolescents were presented with 15 common 
“ situations” that were to be discussed with the 
researcher. The adolescents were given the 
situations a day or two ahead of time and could 
choose which 10 of the 15 situations they 
would like to discuss in a “chat” Each chat 
took about a half day to complete. In order to 
avoid an atmosphere of interrogation the 
researcher took no notes during the session. 
Van Leeuwen records that the interviews 
“demanded a great deal of concentration and 
imaginative understanding on the part of the 
researcher” (p. 252). Again, we cannot help 
wondering if the “imaginative understanding” 
of another researcher would have produced 
different results, especially since the researcher 
recorded no data during approximately 600 
hours of interviews. Van Leeuwen’s description 
of this study suggests a method allowing the 
subjects to carefully prepare their responses 
and encouraging the researcher to interpret 
their responses rather than gather data. It 
seems likely that, rather than actually studying 
the values of adolescents, the researcher 
recorded his own interpretation of what 
adolescents want researchers to believe their 
values are.
In this more human approach even the 
attempts to validate the findings are subjective. 
In order to determine whether his subjects 
were telling the truth during the interviews, 
Kitwood (1980) simply asked them. Van 
Leeuwen (1985) writes that followup letters 
“confirmed both the methodological and 
ethical success of Kitwood’s approach. The 
participants uniformly stated that they had 
spoken of their experiences in a sincere and 
spontaneous manner—often surprising them- 
selves in the process” (pp. 251-253). One 
wonders how “spontaneous” the responses 
were when they could select the topics they 
wished to discuss and had as much as two days 
to prepare for the interview. It would also be of 
interest to know whether the participants 
would also confirm that what Kitwood recorded
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approaches is equivalent to choosing uncon- 
trolled error over controlled error. Objectivity 
continues to be a fruitful approach to 
psychological studies and should not be 
abandoned. Those who wish to look at 
humanity from different perspectives need 
only turn to other disciplines. Sociologists, 
anthropologists, theologians, and creative 
writers all contribute to our understanding.
Finally, Christian critics of psychology 
have accused psychology of immorality 
because of the deception inherent in some 
methodology. We have tried to show that 
deception also exists in the approaches 
advocated by psychology^ critics but in an 
uncontrolled and often hidden form. It could 
be argued that deception in any form is 
immoral but it seems inappropriate to argue 
that one kind of deception is in some way 
better than another. Psychologists recognize 
the moral dilemma created by the necessity of 
deception in research, have wrestled with the 
issues, and have attempted to devise guidelines 
for dealing with it. Advocates of a more 
subjective methodology need to recognize the 
self-deception that can occur as a result of the 
procedures they use in gathering and inter- 
preting data, and the moral dilemma created 
when trying to generalize from their subjective 
world.
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